Supporters of the continuation of the War in Iraq loudly and vociferously proclaim that we can win the war (if only those traitorous Dhimmi-crats weren’t trying to make us lose on purpose).

The Washington Post broke the bad news yesterday that the administration is having a very hard time filling a new position designed to win the war. At least one of the three people asked to be the new “war czar” turned down the job because he believes the administration is not capable of winning the war:

“The very fundamental issue is, they don’t know where the hell they’re going,” said retired Marine Gen. John J. “Jack” Sheehan, a former top NATO commander who was among those rejecting the job. Sheehan said he believes that Vice President Cheney and his hawkish allies remain more powerful within the administration than pragmatists looking for a way out of Iraq. “So rather than go over there, develop an ulcer and eventually leave, I said, ‘No, thanks,’ ” he said.

The others haven’t publicly commented in a clear way, but my impression is that they aren’t optimistic either.

I can see two possibilities here.

If the administration is serious about winning the war, they are going to offer the job to the very best officer they can find. If they were pursuing excellence, the demurrals are bad news for the “carry on the war” crowd: The best and brightest generals don’t think the war can be one.

The other possibility is that the administraton was offering the position to politically reliable officers - “good Bushies” to use the DOJ’s term. We have seen political litmus test for war management before - people being hired to manage the Iraqi reconstruction were asked about their views on abortion. In an amazing appearance on the Daily Show, John Bolton argued (in a very Andy Jackson kind of way) that appointees’ competence was irrelevent - the job of appointees is to carry out presidential directives, not offer advice or expertise. Perhaps these three generals were not approached because of their expertise but because they are politically reliable. Of course, the fact that they managed to rise to the rank of O10 says they must understand something about military capabilities. But let’s assume that the “carry on the war” crowd is right and the tapped officers are wrong. This is still bad news for Bush - even “good Bushies” don’t want to be associated with the impending (existing?) train wreck.

As Tom Lehrer said of the American people and the Vietnam War:

“We’re like a Christian scientist with appendicitis.” Something bad is happening, but aside from prayer, we don’t know what to do about it.

Micheal Dorf has more sobering thoughts:

More broadly still, even if the creation of a war czar were a sensible reaction to an organizational problem, the whole premise that our problems in Iraq (and Afghanistan) are structural/tactical is deeply flawed. To be sure, this new premise represents a kind of progress in that by seeking to adopt a new structure the administration tacitly admits that the existing structure doesn’t work. It is, in other words, an admission of incompetence in managing the occupation. Such an admission will no doubt play well with the Thomas Friedmans and Hillary Clintons of the world—people who supported the war but have criticized the administration’s bungling of the job. But if, as tougher critics warned from the very beginning, the underlying problem is the impossibility of bringing democracy by force of arms to a fractious, resentful people, then even the most clear-eyed shakeup of the management team and its tactics will only delay the inevitable day of reckoning.

Man, I’ve got a bellyache.